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David Noteware* and Tim Bates**
HILE the legislature did not make any extensive changes in the
Workers' Compensation Act during the Survey period, the legisla-
tive committee on workers' compensation reform is currently
holding hearings that may drastically change the Texas workers' compensa-
tion system.' Public demands for reform continue because the cost of the
compensation system remains one of the highest in the nation, while it pro-
vides proportionally low benefits to employees injured on the job.2 The cur-
rent debates and proposed changes in the system affect such areas as the
proposed elimination of the trial de novo, further reduction of attorneys'
fees, and other significant changes.3
SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The courts continue to expand the duties and responsibilities of workers'
compensation insurers while interpreting substantive law under the Work-
ers' Compensation Act. By far, the most significant case of this Survey pe-
riod affecting workers' compensation insurers and employees is Aranda v.
Insurance Co. of North America.4 In Aranda the Texas Supreme Court an-
* B.S., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Texas Law School. Senior Part-
ner with Thompson & Knight, Dallas, Texas.
** B.B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., Southern Methodist University School
of Law. Attorney at Law with Law Offices of Timothy E. Kelley, a P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. See, Dallas Morning News, Nov. 11, 1988, at 1, § D. Senator Bob Glasgow, Co-
Chairman of the Joint Select Committee on Workers' Compensation Reform, told the Texas
Association of Business that the legislature is drawing up recommendations in workers' com-
pensation insurance that could drastically change this system. These changes may include
eliminating lump sum settlements, restricting attorneys' fees, and deleting the trial de novo of
Industrial Accident Board awards. Speaker of the House Gib Lewis stated that it is a high
priority of the House of Representatives to reform the Workers' Compensation Act.
2. See Dallas Morning News, Oct 7, 1988, at 1, § D. A consultant hired to study the
Texas workers' compensation system that stated that it is flawed with one of the highest medi-
cal costs of any state system, it provides unequal benefits for injured workers, and has an
administrative body that lacks the authority and resources to effectively do its job.
3. Id. Representative Richard Smith stated that the workers' compensation bill will be
House Bill Number I when the state legislature convenes in January. A consultant hired to
study the Texas workers' compensation system stated that the trial de novo represents one of
the most controversial issues in Texas workers' compensation law.
4. 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988); see also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Marshall, 724
S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1987) (holding that a cause of action exists against a workers' compen-
sation insurance carrier under TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.21 (Vernon 1981) when the carrier
fails to comply with the terms of a workers' compensation compromise settlement agreement).
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nounced the rule that a workers' compensation insurer has a duty to deal
fairly and in good faith with injured employees when it processes their com-
pensation claims. 5
In Aranda, two companies employed the claimant and each company used
a different workers' compensation insurer. 6 When the Aranda claimant suf-
fered a repetitious traumatic injury, both insurers agreed that the claimant's
injuries occurred during the course of his employment.7 Yet, the insurers
refused to pay the claimant benefits until the Industrial Accident Board
(IAB) resolved which insurer should pay the claim.8 Mr. Aranda brought
suit against both insurers alleging: (1) a breach of the insurers' duty of good
faith and fair dealing in processing his claim, and (2) intentional misconduct
in handling his claim. 9 The trial court and court of appeals agreed with the
insurers that Mr. Aranda's good faith allegations failed to state a cause of
action.10 Further, the court of appeals held that the exclusivity provision of
the Workers' Compensation Act barred Mr. Aranda's intentional miscon-
duct allegations. I
The Texas Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower courts' decisions
and held that the contractual relationship between the insurer and the em-
ployee created a special relationship equal to that established by other types
5. 748 S.W.2d at 212-15.
6. Id. at 211.
7. Id.
8. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5c (Vernon Supp. 1989) (establishes
payment of proportionate share prior to liability determination in cases concerning multiple
subscribers). The legislature amended the Workers' Compensation Act to handle disputes be-
tween carriers similarly situated to the carriers in Aranda. Article 8307, § 5c states:
In any proceeding in which it is determined that compensation, including costs
for medical services incurred, is allowable in a sum certain for injuries sustained
by an employee, but there is a dispute with respect to which of two or more
subscribers said employee was serving at the time of the injury, the Association
and other workers' compensation insurer, or insurers, of each such subscriber
shall be required to pay a proportionate share of the compensation benefits, in-
cluding costs for medical services incurred, for the injuries received. Such pro-
portionate share due from the Association and other workers' compensation
insurer, or insurers, shall be determined by dividing the compensation benefits,
including costs for medical services incurred, by the number of subscribers who
are alleged to have been the employer of the injured employee at the time of
injury, and the Association and workers' compensation insurer of each such sub-
scriber shall pay such proportionate share, or shares, depending on whether they
insure one or more of such subscribers. The Board or court shall deliver the full
amount of the workers' compensation award, including costs for medical serv-
ices incurred, in the same manner as if the sum had been paid only by the re-
sponsible insurer. Thereafter, upon final determination of liability for
compensation, whether by agreement, award of the Board or order of the court,
the insurer, or insurers found not to be liable shall be entitled to reimbursement
for its, or their proportionate share paid from the insurer who is determined to
be liable for compensation and medical costs incurred. No award or judgment
pursuant to this section shall affect any rights of the claimant, directly or collat-
erally, in any other claim or suit, nor shall evidence of such award or judgment
be admissible in any other suit brought by the claimant.
Id.
9. Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 211-12.




of insurance contracts.12 Because this special relationship implicitly creates
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the Texas Supreme Court held that
the insurance carriers must meet heightened standards in the processing and
payment of workers' compensation claims.13 Additionally, the supreme
court noted that the existence of the IAB does not negate the special trust
relationship between the carrier and the employee.14 Finally, the supreme
court held that the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act
does not bar claims for a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
because good faith damages differ from the damages recoverable under a
claim for workers' compensation benefits.1 5
In setting out a cause of action for the breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing against an insurer, the supreme court held that a plaintiff must
prove the following elements:
(1) The carrier does not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits;
(2) The carrier knew or should have known that no reasonable basis
exists for denying the claim or delaying payment of the claim;
(3) The carrier's lack of good faith, separate and independent from the
original job-related injury, proximately caused damages to the
claimant; and
(4) The employee sustained ordinary damages as a result of the car-
rier's action.1 6
If a jury finds that a carrier breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
the claimant may recover ordinary tort damages, and also punitive
damages. 17
Since the Aranda decision two courts have commented on what consti-
tutes a reasonable basis to deny a claim. In Fuentes v. Texas Employers In-
surance Association 18 the insurance carrier had denied benefits to the
employee based upon a medical opinion obtained by the carrier. 19 The trial
court entered summary judgment on behalf of the carrier, holding that the
. 12. Id. at 212. The supreme court also noted the well established rule under Texas law
that "accompanying every contract is a common law duty to perform with care, skill, reason-
able expedience and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe
any of these conditions is a tort as well as a breach of contract." Id. (quoting Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 146 Tex. 153, 157, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (1947) (emphasis ad-
ded). This same duty of care, and faithfulness that arises under common law contracts applies
to insurance contracts.
13. Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 212; see Arnold v.National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725
S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (holding that the insurer owes the insured a duty of good faith
and fair dealing because of the special trust relationship between parties).
14. Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 212. The supreme court noted that the Industrial Accident
Board may ultimately rectify an unreasonable carrier's actions, but the injured employee
would incur interim damages because of his inability to meet basic living expenses or pay for
medical care. Id.
15. Id. at 214. The court noted that the Workers' Compensation Act only bars damages
for personal injuries and thus does not bar damages for tortious bad faith or breach of con-
tract. Id.
16. Id. at 215. In setting out the elements of this cause of action, implicitly included in
the court's discussion are the elements of proximate causation and damages. Id. at 214.
17. Id. at 215.
18. 757 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
19. Id. at 33.
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carrier, which had based the denial of the claim on a medical opinion, had
unequivocally established a reasonable basis for rejecting the claim. 20 Rely-
ing on Aranda and recognizing that carriers have the right to deny question-
able claims, the court of appeals upheld the summary judgment and
established that the simple denial of a claim, although later proven to be in
error, does not subject carriers to liability.21 Tort liability does not attach to
the carrier if a reasonable insurer under similar circumstances would have
denied the claim. 22 Consequently, if the carrier erred in denying the claim,
it will not be liable for bad faith damages if its conduct meets the above-
mentioned, objective standard.23
In Izaguirre v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association 24 three claimants
filed suit against a carrier alleging that the carrier breached its duty of good
faith and fair dealing. 25 Previously the carrier had settled the claimants'
underlying claims for compensation benefits and the claimants had provided
releases for their compensation claims. 26 Two of the releases stated that the
claimants recognized the uncertainty and the incapability of establishing the
carrier's liability.27 A third claimant, however, signed a release that did not
contain this statement. 28
Holding that the settlement of the underlying compensation claims re-
lieved the carrier from any further liability to the injured employees, the trial
court granted summary judgment for the carrier. 29 The court of appeals
upheld the decision as to the first two claimants. The appellate court rea-
soned that in order to recover for the breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing, the claimants must prove either (1) that the carrier had no rea-
sonable basis to deny their claim or delay payment of benefits, or (2) that the
insurer failed to establish that a reasonable basis existed for the denial or the
delay. 30 Because the settlement documents specifically recognized the un-
certainty of the claims, the court of appeals held as a matter of law that the
carrier could not be liable for any alleged breach of the good faith and fair
dealing duty.3' Regarding the claimant that did not sign a release contain-
20. Id. at 32.
21. Id. at 33-34. The court held as a matter of law that the denial of the claim based upon
a medical opinion is a reasonable basis for denying payment of compensation claims.
22. Id. at 33.
23. Id. at 33-34; see also Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d at 212 (estab-
lishing that carriers may deny invalid or questionable claims without subjecting themselves to
liability for an erroneous denial of a claim).
24. 749 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
25. Id. at 552.
26. Id. at 555.
27. Id. The statement signed by the claimants stated: "I understand and agree that the
liability of said Insurance Carrier is indefinite, uncertain and incapable of being satisfactorily
established .. " Id.
28. Id. The insurer did not explain why it did not insert the standard uncertainty clause
into this claimant's release.
29. Id. at 552.
30. Id. at 555; see also Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex.
1988) (discusses the elements of the duty of good faith and fair dealing). For a discussion of
the Aranda decision, see supra notes 4-17 and accompanying text.
31. Isaguirre, 749 S.W.2d at 555.
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ing the provision relating to the uncertainty of his claim, the court of appeals
specifically held that this claimant alleged a valid cause of action for the
breach of the good faith and fair dealing duty. 32
Holding that an action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing sounds in tort, the court rejected the insurance carrier's statute of limita-
tions defense. 33 The court found that a two-year statute of limitations
governs the cause of action. 34 This claim, however, arises not from the in-
jury on the employment, but rather from separate acts during the processing
of the claim.3 5 An alleged series of incidents over a period of time consti-
tutes a continuous injury, and thus the statute of limitations does not begin
to run until the conduct ends or the parties resolve the underlying claim. 36
B. Course and Scope of Employment
Under the Workers' Compensation Act, an employee may recover com-
pensation if he sustains an injury in the course of employment. 37 The Act
defines "injuries sustained in the course of employment" to
include all other injuries of every kind and character having to do with
and originating in the work, business, trade or profession of the em-
ployer received by an employee while engaged in or about the further-
ance of the affairs or business of his employer, whether upon the
employer's premises or elsewhere.38
In Lujan v. Houston General Insurance Co. 39 the Texas Supreme Court
interpreted the application of the requirement that the injury occur in the
course of employment to include a delayed action injury.40 A delayed action
injury is an injury precipitated by job-related events that does not actually
occur until after the employee leaves his job premises. 4 1
In Lujan the claimant, a painter, used a pressurized spray unit to apply
paint mixed with a thinner.42 When Mr. Lujan attempted to fix a leak in the
equipment, a line blew and covered him with paint.43 Thereafter, Mr. Lujan
used gasoline to remove the paint.44 Because his employer did not provide
facilities for rinsing off the residue, Mr. Lujan went home in order to use his
own facilities. 45 When Mr. Lujan entered his bathroom, the pilot light from
the heater ignited the gasoline fumes from his body and Mr. Lujan died in a
32. Id.
33. Id. at 555-56; see Aranda, 748 S.W.2d at 213; Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987).
34. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986).
35. Isaguirre, 749 S.W.2d at 556.
36. Id.
37. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3b (Vernon 1967).
38. Id. art. 8309, § 1(4) (emphasis added).
39. 756 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1988).
40. Id. at 297.
41. Id. (citing 1A A. LARSON, LAW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 29.22 (1985)).
42. Id. at 295.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 295-96.
45. Id. at 296.
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flash fire. 46 While the jury found that Mr. Lujan's injuries occurred in the
course of his employment, the court of appeals rendered judgment in favor
of the carrier.47
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial
court's judgment.48 The supreme court held that Mr. Lujan's injuries
originated in his employment as a matter of law because job-related events
triggered his death. 49 These events included getting paint on his body while
at work and attempting to clean the paint with gasoline because the em-
ployer failed to provide bathing facilities. 50 The supreme court rejected the
carrier's argument that the Workers' Compensation Act covers only injuries
that arise directly from an accident that occurs while the employee is work-
ing. The supreme court's decision reaffirmed that the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act should be liberally construed in favor of the worker.5 '
Although an employee may sustain injuries at his job site, the injuries may
not necessarily occur in the course of employment. For example, the Work-
ers' Compensation Act specifically excludes from the definition of an injury
sustained in the course of employment an injury resulting from a third per-
son's actions that do not relate to the injured employee's employment.5 2
Some courts and commentators refer to this exception as the "personal ani-
mosity" exception.53 Two recent cases show the effect of this exception.
In Security Insurance Co. v. Nasser5 4 a jealous boyfriend of a customer
assaulted and killed an employee after the boyfriend saw the employee con-
versing with his girlfriend. 55 The injured employee filed a workers' compen-
sation claim, but the carrier refused to pay the claim. The carrier asserted
the personal animosity exception as a defense, alleging that the employee's
death resulted from a personal attack and that the assailant did not direct
the attack against the employee because of his employment. 56
At trial, Mr. Nasser's estate introduced evidence showing that Mr. Nas-
ser's duties as an employee included spending time with customers and, in
46. Id.
47. Id. The judge asked the jury whether Mr. Lujan's work or the conditions of his em-
ployment resulted in an injury to him which was a producing cause of his death. The jury
answered this question favorably to Mr. Lujan. Id.
48. Id. at 298.
49. Id. at 297. The court noted that by enacting the Workers' Compensation Act the
legislature intended to compensate employees whose injuries "hav[e] to do with and originat[e]
in the work, business, trade or profession of the employer ..... Id. (quoting TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(4) (Vernon 1967)).
50. Id. at 296-97.
51. Id. at 297; see Hargrove v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 152 Tex. 243, 246, 256 S.W.2d
73, 75 (1953); Yeldell v. Holiday Hills Retirement & Nursing Center, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 243,
245 (Tex. 1985).
52. "An injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employee because
of reasons personal to him and not directed against him as an employee, or because of his
employment." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(2) (Vernon 1967).
53. See A. LARSON, LAW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 11.21 (1985).
54. 755 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ), on remand from
724 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. 1987).




his capacity as an employee he became acquainted with the girl.57 Had it
not been for her visits to the restaurant as a customer and Mr. Nasser's duty
to be friendly with her, the assailant would never have seen the two talk-
ing. 58 After a jury verdict in favor of the claimant's estate, the court of
appeals reversed the jury verdict and held that no evidence existed to show
that the assailant intended to injure Mr. Nasser because of his
employment. 59
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case to
the lower court to consider other points of error because the personal ani-
mosity exception did not apply.6° The court gave two reasons in explaining
its holding.6 1 First, the court found that some evidence supported the jury's
finding that the claimant suffered injuries in the course of his employment. 62
The supreme court focused on the claimant's responsibility to act in a
friendly manner towards customers, and the fact that this courtesy resulted
in the assailant attacking the claimant. 63 In explaining the personal animos-
ity exception, the court stated that the exception only applies to disputes that
have been transported into the place of employment from the injured em-
ployee's private or domestic life and that do not exist as a result of the claim-
ant's employment. 64
Additionally, the supreme court found that the jury's verdict incorporated
a finding that the assailant's mental status prevented him from intending to
assault the employee. 65 When an insane or irrational assailant injures an
employee, the personal animosity exception does not apply because the as-
sailant does not intend to injure the employee solely as the result of personal
57. Id. at 190-91.
58. Id. at 191.
59. Id. at 188-89. The jury issue consisted of the following:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence, that Izzat Nasser was in-
jured in the course of his employment on or about February 20, 1981?
"'INJURY IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT' means any injury having
to do with and originating [from] the work, business, trade, or profession of the
employer, received by an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of
the affairs or business of his employer, whether upon the employer's premises or
elsewhere. An injury is not in the course of employment if it is caused by the act
of another person intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to
the employee and not directed against him as an employee or because of his
employment. A person cannot intend to injure an employee if the person is
incapable of entertaining a rational intent or is incapable of rational reasoning."
ANSWER ("We do," or "We do not.")
ANSWER We do.
Id. at 189-90.
60. Nasser v. Security Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. 1987).
61. Id. at 18-19.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 19. The supreme court emphasized that if not for the girlfriend's visits to the
restaurant as a customer, the assailant would never have seen the employee talking to his
girlfriend. Id.
64. Id. The court noted that "whenever conditions attached to the place of employment
or otherwise incident to the employment are factors in the catastrophic combination, the con-




motivations. 66 Thus, when asserting the personal animosity defense, the car-
rier must prove the following three elements: (1) the assailant's intent to
injure the employee; (2) the assault occurred because of personal reasons;
and (3) the assault did not occur because of reasons associated with the
claimant's employment or employee status.67 On remand, the court of ap-
peals affirmed the jury verdict. 68
The Dallas court of appeals recently reviewed the personal animosity ex-
ception in light of the Nasser opinion. In Porter v. Dallas Independent
School District 69 the court of appeals held that the mere fact that an assail-
ant kills an employee on the premises of his employer does not mean that the
killing occurred in the course of his employment.70 In Porter a school
janitor, while on duty at the school, noticed a child near his automobile
which was parked at his nearby residence. 7' Thinking that the child was
vandalizing his car, the janitor left the school premises, confronted the child
in front of his residence, and spanked the child. 72 Thereafter, the child left
and the janitor returned to the school.73 Later, the child's grandmother ap-
proached the janitor on school premises and shot and killed him. 74
The Dallas court of appeals reversed a jury verdict in favor of the claim-
ant's estate and held that the claimant's death did not occur during the
course of his employment because the grandmother killed him for personal
reasons. 75 The appellate court explained that the' assailant did not kill the
janitor because he worked for the school district or because of his janitorial
duties. Additionally, the janitor was not acting in furtherance of his em-
ployer's business when he left the school property to discipline the child.76
Consequently, the injury resulted from a dispute that arose in the janitor's
private life but had severe repercussions in his place of employment.77 The
court of appeals, therefore, applied the personal animosity exception. 78
C Prejudgment Interest
In Jones v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 79 the Texas Supreme Court held
66. 755 S.W.2d at 192-93.
67. See Nasser, 724 S.W.2d at 18 n.1; TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(2)
(Vernon 1967).
68. 755 S.W.2d at 187.
69. 759 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, petition for writ of error filed).
70. Id. at 455-56.
71. Id. at 455.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 456.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 455-57.
78. See id. at 456; see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(2) (Vernon 1967),
which excludes from the definition of an injury sustained in the course of employment:
(2) An injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the em-
ployee because of reasons personal to him and not directed against him as an
employee, or because of his employment.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(2) (Vernon 1967).
79. 745 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1988).
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that a workers' compensation insurer may not recover prejudgment interest
in a third-party subrogation case.8 0 The injured worker in Jones filed a
third-party suit against other parties for injuries received in the automobile
accident that caused his occupational injury.8 ' The compensation insurer
intervened for its subrogation interest.8 2 After the award of damages to the
plaintiff, the trial court allowed the insurer to recover the proportionate
amount of prejudgment interest attributable to the amounts it had previ-
ously paid the claimant.8 3 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
judgment. 84
The supreme court reversed the lower courts' holdings and held that a
compensation insurer may not recover prejudgment interest on the sums
that it paid to or on behalf of the workers' compensation claimant when it
intervenes in the injured employee's third party action.85 The court rea-
soned that the Workers' Compensation Act explicitly provides that the in-
surer may only recover: (1) past compensation benefits paid; (2) medical
expenses paid; and (3) attorneys' fees.8 6 The court also explained that the
Workers' Compensation Act governs the compensation insurer's right to
subrogation.8 7 Thus, the supreme court ruled that the injured employee
alone recovers all prejudgment interest. 88 This holding allowed the plaintiffs
to enjoy the use of compensation benefits and to recover the interest on those
benefits from the third-party tortfeasors.
After Cavnar v. Quality Control Parking Inc.8 9 the question of whether an
80. Id. at 903.
81. Id. at 901.
82. Id.; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (Vernon Supp. 1989) governs a com-
pensation carrier's right to subrogation. Article 8307, § 6a provides:
(a) If compensation can be claimed under this law by the injured employee
or his legal beneficiaries, then the Association shall be subrogated to the rights
of the injured employee, and may enforce in the name of the injured employee or
his legal beneficiaries the liability of said other person, and in case the recovery
is for a sum greater than that paid or assumed by the association to the em-
ployee or his legal beneficiaries, then out of the sum so recovered the association
shall reimburse itself and pay said costs and the excess so recovered shall be paid
to the injured employee or his beneficiaries.
(c) If at the conclusion of a third-party action a workmen's compensation
beneficiary is entitled to compensation, the net amount recovered by such benefi-
ciary from the third-party action shall be applied to reimburse the association
for past benefits and medical expenses paid and any amount in excess of past
benefits and medical expenses shall be treated as an advance against future bene-
fit payments of compensation to which the beneficiary is entitled to receive
under the Act.
Id.
83. 745 S.W.2d at 901.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 903.
86. Id. at 902.
87. Id. at 903.
88. Id.; see also Moseley v. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 748 S.W.2d 226, 227
(Tex. 1988) (holding that a self-insured entity such as the Texas Department of Highways and
Public Transportation may not recover prejudgment interest of their subrogation claim of
workers' compensation benefits).
89. 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985). Cavnar drastically changed damages in tort cases by
allowing plaintiffs to recover prejudgment interest on all claims for personal injury damages.
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employee may recover prejudgment interest on medical expenses in a work-
ers' compensation case remained unanswered. In Standard Fire Insurance
Co. v. Morgan 90 the supreme court held as a matter of law that an employee
in a workers' compensation case cannot recover prejudgment interest on past
medical expenses. The high state court distinguished the holding in Cavnar
on the basis that Cavnar dealt with damages under the Wrongful Death Act
and not damages under the Workers' Compensation Act.91
Additionally, the supreme court recognized that the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act allows for recovery of prejudgment interest on past due weekly in-
stallments. 92 Past medical expenses, however, do not constitute past due
weekly installments within the meaning of the Compensation Act.93 Three
justices argued that an injured employee should be allowed to recover pre-
judgment interest on past medical expenses in order to make the claimant
whole. 94 Since the Workers' Compensation Act should be liberally con-
strued in favor of the injured employee, and the Act remains silent as to the
recovery of prejudgment interest on unpaid medical expenses, the dissenters
argued that the court should interpret the Act's silence favorably for the
employee and allow prejudgment interest. 95
D. Period of Incapacity
In order to recover workers' compensation benefits, an injured employee
must be incapacitated for at least a period of one week. 96 In Garcia v. Insur-
The Texas Supreme Court justified its allowance of prejudgment interest in personal injury
actions by noting that the award of prejudgment interest helps to make the plaintiff whole. Id.
at 552. Prejudgment interest further compensates personal injury claimants for the lost oppor-
tunity of investment proceeds that they could have earned on interest on the damages between
the time of the occurrence and the time of the judgment. Id.
90. 745 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. 1987).
91. Id. at 313. The court reasoned that the legislature, by enacting an exact compensation
scheme within the Workers' Compensation Act, distinguished this fact scenario from an action
under the Wrongful Death Act as discussed in Cavnar. Id.; see also General Elec. Co. v.
Kunze, 747 S.W.2d 826, 832-33 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ denied) (holding that an em-
ployee could not recover prejudgment interest on his damages for lost past wages and lost past
employment benefits, because his economic expert compounded interest on damages that were
argued to the jury).
92. 745 S.W.2d at 313.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 313-14. Justices Robertson, Ray, and Mauzy concurred, and dissented from the
majority opinion. Id. at 313.
95. Id. at 314. The Texas Supreme Court has recognized that courts should construe the
Workers' Compensation Act liberally in favor of the employee. Navarette v. Temple Indep.
School Dist., 706 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1986).
96. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 6 (Vernon 1967). Article 8306, § 6, states:
No compensation shall be paid under this law for an injury which does not
incapacitate the employee for a period of at least one week from earning full
wages, but if incapacity extends beyond one week compensation shall begin to
accrue on the eighth day after the injury. The medical aid, hospital services,
chiropractic services and medicines, as provided for in Section 7 hereof, shall be
supplied as and when needed, and according to the terms and provisions of said
Section 7. If incapacity does not follow at once after the infliction of the injury
or within eight days thereof but does result subsequently, compensation shall
begin to accrue with the eighth day after the date incapacity commenced. In
any event the employee shall be entitled to the medical aid, hospital service,
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ance Co. 97 the Texas Supreme Court addressed the question of what consti-
tutes incapacity for a period of one week. On December 14, 1984, Mrs.
Garcia fell at work and injured herself.98 She went to the infirmary and
returned to her duties without receiving medication or treatment. 99 Mrs.
Garcia did not report for work on December 15 and 16, but returned to
work on December 17.100 Thereafter, Mrs. Garcia left work on December
19 and went to a hospital emergency room because she was experiencing
pain. 0 1 The following day she returned to work.1 0 2 Later, Mrs. Garcia
went on vacation from December 22 to January 14 and after a short return
to work, she left work on January 17 to visit a doctor. 0 3 On January 23 she
began missing work due to her previous injury. Because she failed to report
to work on January 24, 25, and 28 without notifying her employer, Mrs.
Garcia's employer terminated her employment on February 1.104
In Garcia the jury determined that Mrs. Garcia became permanently and
partially incapacitated beginning January 23, 1985.105 The court of appeals
reversed and rendered judgment for the carrier because Mrs. Garcia testified
on cross examination that her injuries neither caused her to miss work for as
long as a week, nor incapacitated her from earning full wages for a week. 106
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals' decision, reasoning that
some evidence existed that Mrs. Garcia's injuries kept her from earning full
wages from December 22 to January 14, her vacation period, and for some
time period after her termination.10 7 The supreme court found that Mrs.
Garcia's testimony did not constitute a judicial admission and that the court
of appeals used the wrong standard in evaluating the testimony. The
supreme court held that the court of appeals should have considered only
the evidence tending to support the jury finding of permanent and partial
incapacity and should have disregarded all evidence to the contrary.
0 8
chiropractic service, and medicines provided in this law. Provided further, that
if such incapacity continues for four (4) weeks or longer, compensation shall be
computed from the inception date of such incapacity.
Id.
97. 751 S.W.2d 857, 858 (Tex. 1988).







105. Id.. at 858.
106. Id. Mrs. Garcia testified on cross-examination:
(Question) Following your fall, December 14, 1984, Mrs. Garcia, you were
never off for as long as a week because of that injury, were you?
(Answer) Well, no.





108. Id. In deciding a no-evidence point, the standard of review is that the court of appeals
can consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the finding and the court
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E. Representative of Insurer
Since the last survey, the Fort Worth court of appeals addressed the ques-
tion of whether an employee of the subscriber can act as a representative of
the insurance carrier for trial purposes. In McKinney v. National Union Fire
Insurance Co. 109 the plaintiff invoked the "rule" under rule 267 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure. 110 During the trial, a safety administrator of the
claimant's employer remained in the courtroom and later testified as the rep-
resentative of the insurance company.I1 I The claimant objected, stating that
because the safety administrator did not work as an employee of the insur-
ance carrier, he could not act as its representative under rule 267. Because
the safety administrator heard other witnesses' testimony after the invoca-
tion of the rule, the claimant further argued that the court should not allow
the safety administrator to testify. 112
In analyzing rule 267, the trial court ruled that the safety administrator
could act as a representative of the insurance carrier, even though the insur-
ance carrier did not employ him.1 13 The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's decision, noting that employment does not constitute a prerequisite
to being a representative of the insurer under rule 267.114
F Subrogation-Attorneys' Fees
The trial court possesses wide discretion in the apportionment of attor-
neys' fees in workers' compensation subrogation cases.' 15 In Twin City Fire
Insurance Co. v. Meave 1 16 the employee's wrongful death beneficiaries
brought a third-party action, which settled during the trial." 7 The compen-
sation carrier intervened in the suit for reimbursement of death benefits it
paid on behalf of the deceased, and for any future payments due to the fain-
must disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Id., (citing Aim v. Aluminum Co.
of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tex. 1986)).
109. 747 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ granted).
110. TEX. R. Civ. P. 267. Rule 267 stated, at the time of trial:
Neither party to the suit shall be placed under the rule. Where a corporation is
a party to the suit, the court may exempt from the rule an officer or other repre-
sentative of such corporation to aid counsel in the presentation of the case. If
any party be absent the court in its discretion may exempt from the rule a repre-
sentative of such party.
Id.
111. 747 S.W.2d at 910.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see also Yates v. Pacific Indem. Co., 193 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (allowing the employee of an employer to be the representa-
tive for a workers' compensation carrier in a compensation case). The appellate court's inter-
pretation makes practical sense because, while the Workers' Compensation Act makes the
plaintiff sue the compensation carrier, in essence employees of the employer will have more
knowledge about the nature of the injury, especially a safety administrator in an alleged toxic
chemical case.
114. 747 S.W.2d at 910.
115. See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Branton & Mendelsohn, Inc., 670 S.W.2d 699, 703-04 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).




ily of the deceased.'1 8 After the settlement, the trial court apportioned at-
torneys' fees between the plaintiff's attorney and the carrier's attorney from
the amount awarded to the insurance carrier for its subrogation interest. 19
The carrier appealed from the apportionment of attorneys' fees to the
plaintiff's attorney, claiming that it did not benefit from his work. Addition-
ally, the carrier asserted that the plaintiff's attorney should have, but did
not, present a detailed account of hours expended in the prosecution of the
plaintiff's case and an appropriate hourly rate. 120 The court of appeals re-
jected these assertions, holding that the carrier obviously benefitted from the
plaintiff's attorney's negotiating a settlement that satisfied the carrier's sub-
rogation claim.' 2 1 Further, the court of appeals held that to recover attor-
neys' fees under the Act the claimant need only prove the nature and extent
of the attorney's services. 122 Specifically, the court of appeals required no
specific itemization of attorneys' fees.
G. Collateral Estoppel
In Medina v. El Paso Machine & Steel Works, Inc.' 23 the court held that
jury issues answered in a workers' compensation case collaterally estopped
the employee from relitigating those issues in a third-party action. 124 Me-
dina involved a construction worker who, following an accident, filed a
workers' compensation claim and also filed a third-party action against other
defendants alleging tort damages.' 25 The trial court severed the workers'
compensation case from the third-party action and tried the workers' com-
pensation case first.' 26
118. Id.
119. Id. at 766. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a(b) (Vernon Supp. 1989). Sec-
tion 6a(b) provides for apportionment of attorneys' fees in workers' compensation subrogation
actions. Section 6a(b) states:
[i]f the Association obtains an attorney to actively represent its interest and if
the attorney actively participates in obtaining a recovery, the court shall award
and apportion an attorneys' fee allowable out of the association's subrogation
recovery between such attorneys taking into account the benefit accruing to the
association as a result of each attorney's service, the aggregate of such fees not to
exceed thirty-three and one-third percent (331/3%) of the subrogated interest.
Id.
120. 743 S.W.2d at 766. The apportionment of attorneys' fees lies within the sound discre-
tion of the trial court. Hartford Ins. Co., 670 S.W.2d at 703-04. The court of appeals deter-
mines whether the trial court abused its discretion by looking at the facts of each case
individually. University of Texas v. Melchor, 696 S.W.2d 406, 407-08 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
121. 743 S.W.2d at 766-67. The plaintiff's attorney described his work on the case, and the
appellate court noted the extensiveness of the attorney's work. Id.
122. Id. at 766. The appellate court determined that the attorney did not need to submit
either a detailed account of the hours he expended on the case or an hourly rate to justify the
apportionment of attorneys' fees under the Workers' Compensation Act. Id.; see University of
Texas v. Melchor, 696 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ);
Hartford Ins. Co. v. Branton & Mendelsohn, Inc., 670 S.W.2d 699, 703-04 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1984, no writ).
123. 740 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, no writ).
124. Id. at 101.




At the trial of the workers' compensation case the jury found that the
claimant did not receive an injury and that the construction company did
not employ the claimant. 127 The third-party defendants moved for summary
judgment in their case, asserting that collateral estoppel barred the plaintiff
from alleging in the third-party action that he received any injuries from the
accident. 128 Based on the jury finding in the workers' compensation case,
the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the third-party defend-
ants and held that the previously answered jury issues estopped the claimant
from asserting a claim for injuries received in the accident.' 29
The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment, noting that the
claimant did not bring forth on appeal any claims of error about a, lack of
fairness or a heavier burden or a denial of due process.' 30 Taking judicial
notice that a jury is more apt to render a verdict against a defendant whom it
knows has insurance, as compared to a third-party action when neither party
can introduce evidence of insurance, the appellate court affirmed the use of
collateral estoppel in this situation.' 3' The court of appeals reasoned that if
the employee could not obtain an affirmative injury finding in the compensa-
tion case, he should not be able to relitigate his injury allegations in the
third-party case. 132
H. Diversity Jurisdiction
For years federal courts usually have refused to exercise jurisdiction over
workers' compensation cases. The Fifth Circuit in Hernandez v. Travelers
Insurance Co. 133 and Campbell v. Insurance Co. of North America 134 applied
28 U.S.C. section 1332(c)1 35 and dismissed the compensation claims for lack
of jurisdiction. Section 1332(c) provides:
That in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of
liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which
action insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be
deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as
of any State by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State




130. Id. The appellate court limits its review to only those issues expressly presented and
raised at the trial court. An appellate court cannot consider other grounds as reversible error
on appeal. See Fantastic Homes, Inc. v. Combs, 596 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1979); City of Houston
v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979).
131. 740 S.W.2d at 101. The court noted that courts usually take judicial notice of the fact
that juries are more likely to render judgments against defendants whom they know have
insurance. Id. See Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Jones, 383 S.W.2d 610, 613-14 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
132. Id.
133. 489 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
134. 552 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982).
136. Id. The legislature amended this statute in 1964 in response to direct action statutes
adopted in Louisiana and Wisconsin. S. REP. No. 1308, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in
1964, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2778, 2779.
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The Hernandez court analyzed the situation where the claimant filed an
appeal from the award of the IAB. 137 In Hernandez the Fifth Circuit held
that a suit filed against an insurer under a workers' compensation statute
represented a "direct action" within the meaning of section 1332(c). 138 Fur-
ther, the appellate court held that workers' compensation insurance consti-
tuted an insurance policy or contract within the meaning of the same
section. 139
The Fifth Circuit distinguished Hernandez from a later case concerning
an appeal by the workers' compensation carrier of a workers' compensation
award by the IAB. 140 In Campbell, the carrier, instead of the claimant, filed
suit to set aside the IAB award. Despite this distinction from Hernandez,
the Campbell court reasoned that the same policy considerations of Her-
nandez applied to the facts in Campbell. The Campbell court reasoned that
because the burden of proof lies on the claimant in a workers' compensation
de novo proceeding, and the parties would be formally realigned, the reason-
ing in the Hernandez court still held sway. 141 Thus, the Campbell court
dismissed the cause for lack of jurisdiction. 142
The Sixth Circuit, in Aetna Casualty & Surety Insurance Co. v. Greene,' 43
rejected the holding of the Campbell case. 14 Thus in Northbrook National
Insurance Co. v. Brewer 145 the Fifth Circuit decided to reexamine its hold-
ings in the Hernandez and Campbell cases. The plaintiff urged that a work-
ers' compensation case does not constitute a direct action in that the plaintiff
does not bring a suit directly against an insurer when he could have placed
liability upon the insured. 146 Also, the carrier, relying upon the Aetna opin-
ion, argued that the Campbell court erred in applying section 1332(c) to an
action brought by rather than against an insurer. 147 Finally, the carrier con-
tended that the workers' compensation policy at issue did not amount to a
"6policy or contract of liability insurance" within the meaning of section
1332.148 The three-judge panel deciding the Brewer case held that without
an en banc hearing it remained bound by the opinions in Hernandez and
Campbell and, therefore, it affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss
137. 489 F.2d at 724.
138. Id. at 722-23. A direct action statute allows an injured party to bring a cause of action
directly against the insurance carrier as compared to suing the insured. See Northbrook Nat'l
Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 854 F.2d 742, 743 (5th Cir. 1988).
139. 489 F.2d at 722; see Brewer, 854 F.2d at 744.
140. 552 F.2d at 604.
141. Id. at 605; see Brewer, 854 F.2d at 744-45. The Brewer court noted that Campbell
remains a controversial case in the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 745; see also Dairyland Ins. Co. v.
Makover, 654 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that an insurance company could
bring a declaratory judgment action in federal court to determine whether its policy covered a
particular automobile accident). In this case, the majority determined that section 1332(c) did
not apply, thus giving the district court subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1125.
142. 552 F.2d at 605.
143. 606 F.2d 123 (6th Cir. 1979).
144. Id. at 127.
145. 854 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1988), appeal pending.





the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 149
. Punitive Damages
Injured employees generally may not recover punitive damages from their
employers in workers' compensation cases. The estate of a deceased em-
ployee, however, may recover punitive damages from the employer when the
employer's willful acts or omissions result in the death of the employee. 150
In Otis Elevator Co. v. Joseph 151 the court addressed the issue of whether the
employee's own negligence should be compared to the gross negligence of
the employer with a resultant reduction in damages.
In Joseph the trial court submitted an issue inquiring of and comparing
the employer's gross negligence to the employee's ordinary negligence. The
jury found that the employee's negligence amounted to sixty-five percent of
the cause of his death and that the employer's gross negligence constituted
thirty-five percent of the cause of the employee's death. 152 Thereafter, the
trial court disregarded the jury findings and awarded all of the exemplary
damages to the employee's estate. 153 The court of appeals upheld the trial
court's judgment and noted that the trial court should not have submitted
issues comparing the ordinary negligence of the employee and the gross neg-
ligence of the employer to the jury. 154 The appellate court reasoned that the
different theories underlying ordinary negligence and gross negligence and
their different elements of proof make the two theories incompatible. 155
Further, although article 33.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code' 56 bars recovery of actual damages by a plaintiff whose negligence
amounts to more than fifty percent in a negligence action, that section does
not apply to actions. 1 57
149. Id. at 745. The court's opinion gives a tone that they would like to reconsider Camp-
bell, and predicts that Campbell possibly could be overturned. Id.
150. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306 § 3a (Vernon 1967). Under this section, an
employee waives his common law rights if he does not give a written notice to his employer
that he does not wish to waive these rights. However, the employee does not waive his consti-
tutional rights, which allow his estate to recover damages for his wrongful death if the gross
negligence of the employer causes the employee's death. See Wright v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 725
S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. 1987).
151. 749 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ). But see Wright v.
Gifford-Hill & Co., 736 S.W.2d 828, 833 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Jannette
v. Deprez, 701 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pedernales Elec.
Coop., Inc. v. Schultz, 583 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
152. 749 S.W.2d at 922-23.
153. Id.
154. Id.; see 725 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1987); Anderson v. Trent, 685 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Turner v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 733 S.W.2d 242, 244
(Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Wright v. Gifford-Hill & Co.,
736 S.W.2d 828, 833 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Jannette v. Deprez, 701
S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pedernales Elec. Coop., Inc. v.
Schultz, 583 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
155. 749 S.W.2d at 922. The court noted that punitive damages exist to punish the defend-
ant and not compensate the plaintiff.
156. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon Supp. 1989).




The Workers' Compensation Act prohibits employers from discharging or
discriminating against employees for the following reasons: (1) the employee
in good faith filed a workers' compensation claim; or (2) the employee hired
a lawyer to represent him in a claim; or (3) the employee instituted, or
caused to be instituted, in good faith, any proceeding under the Workers'
Compensation Act; or (4) the employee testified or is about to testify in any
compensation proceeding. 158
In General Electric Co. v. Kunze 159 an employee alleged that the company
wrongfully discharged him because he pursued a claim. 16° In Kunze the
employee had worked for his employer for nineteen years before he injured
himself on the job. 161 He worked in his employer's Houston office for seven-
teen years, transferred to the Baton Rouge office for one year, and then
transferred to the Waco office where he sustained a job-related injury.162
After the compensation carrier refused to pay his medical bills, he returned
to work and told his boss that he intended to retain an attorney to handle his
workers' compensation claim. 163 His boss became very upset and told him
that he could not hire an attorney to prosecute his compensation claim. 164
Later his boss gave him several derogatory evaluations, and thereafter fired
him based on his alleged poor job performance at the Waco office. 165
At trial the employee produced evidence to demonstrate that his firing
resulted from his prosecution of his workers' compensation claim and not
because of his job performance at the Waco office. Although the employer
originally explained that it had fired the employee because of his perform-
ance in the Waco office, the employer attempted to introduce into evidence
documents that portrayed that the employee had an unsatisfactory work rec-
ord in the Houston office as well. 166 The employer argued that the evidence
of job performance at the Houston office refuted the employee's inference
158. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1989). Article 8307c provides:
Section 1. No person may discharge or in any other manner discriminate
against any employee because the employee has in good faith filed a claim, hired
a lawyer to represent him in a claim, instituted, or caused to be instituted, in
good faith, any proceeding under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, or
has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding.
Section 2. A person who violates any provision of Section 1 of this Act shall be
liable for reasonable damages suffered by an employee as a result of the viola-
tion, and an employee discharged in violation of the Act shall be entitled to be
reinstated to his former position. The burden of proof shall be upon the
employee.
Id.
159. 747 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ denied).
160. Id. at 828.
161. Id.
162. Id. Approximately three days after working in the Waco office, the employee injured
his back. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id. The employee's boss testified that she did not tell the employee that he could
not hire an attorney, and that she did not become upset with him when he told her that he
planned to hire an attorney. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 829. The court noted that the employer originally alleged that it had fired the
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that he was a good employee for nineteen years at both the Houston and
Waco offices. The trial court refused to admit this evidence.1 6 7 On appeal,
the employer asserted that the evidence should have been admitted because
(1) it rebutted an inference created by the employee that he was a satisfac-
tory employee during his nineteen-year tenure; (2) it related to the em-
ployee's allegations of lost future wages and benefits; and (3) it corroborated
the employer's evidence that the company fired the employee because of his
poor work performance.' 68
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude this evi-
dence, holding that the employee's implied inference that he was a good
employee for nineteen years did not justify the introduction of rebuttal evi-
dence.169 Further, the court of appeals held that the employee's work record
in the Houston or Baton Rouge offices did not tend to prove or disprove the
issue of why the company fired him from the Waco office, because the em-
ployer only asserted that the employee's job performance in Waco necessi-
tated the employment termination.170 The appellate court, however, did not
rule on whether the employer could admit the past work record as evidence
on the issue of the employee's lost future wages and benefits, because the
employer did not offer it for this purpose at trial.' 7'
Article 8307c allows employees wrongfully discharged to recover reason-
able damages and allows the employee to be reinstated to his former posi-
tion.' 72 Since the jury had awarded the employee lost future wages for the
wrongful discharge, the employer argued that an employee must seek rein-
statement as a precondition to recover any future lost wages under article
8307c.173 The court of appeals rejected the employer's argument, holding
that reinstatement is not a precondition to recovering lost future wages. Ad-
ditionally, the appellate court noted that, because the employer willfully and
maliciously discharged the employee in violation of the statute, reinstate-
ment in this case would be impracticable. 74
K. Reservation of Common Law Rights
The legislature designed the Workers' Compensation Act to provide an
employee with speedy and ascertainable compensation for on-the-job injuries
regardless of his employer's liability. In exchange for these guarantees, the
employee gives up his common law rights to sue his employer for negligence,
unless the employee reserves these rights by giving proper written notice to
employee because of his poor work performance at the Waco Division, and not because of his





171. Id. see TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 105(b) (an appellate court cannot consider the trial court's
alleged error for not admitting evidence based on grounds that were not submitted to the trial
court).
172. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1989).
173. 747 S.W.2d at 830-31.
174. Id. at 831.
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his employer. 175 Failure to give written notice to an employer constitutes a
waiver of the employee's common law rights. 176 These duties and rights
under the Workers' Compensation Act apply to all employees, regardless of
their age. 177
In Whitehead v. American Industrial Transportation, Inc. 178 the mother of
a minor employee who died in a job-related accident sued the employer
under the Wrongful Death Statute.179 In trying to circumvent the exclusiv-
ity of the Workers' Compensation Act, the Whitehead plaintiff advanced two
arguments. First, she argued that minor employees do not have to give writ-
ten notice to their employers in order to reserve their common law rights.
Second, the plaintiff asserted that, if the written notice provision applies to
minors, it is unconstitutional because it denies minors due process of law and
access to the courts as guaranteed by the United States and Texas
Constitutions. 8 0
Both the trial court and the court of appeals held that the written notice
provision does apply to minors and that the employee's estate did not have a
cause of action outside of the Workers' Compensation Act. 181 The appellate
court noted that the legislature clearly intended for the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act to apply to minors because several sections of the Act refer to mi-
nors.' 8 2 While the appellate tribunal realized that sometimes the legislature
exempts minors from strict requirements of the law, the court emphasized
that the legislature, not state or federal constitutions, mandates these
exemptions.
In addressing the plaintiff's second argument that the waiver provision
violates the minor employee's due process rights and violated the Texas open
courts provision, the court held that the plaintiff had not shown the opera-
tion of these constitutional provisions harmed the minor employee.' 8 3 Ap-
parently, the summary judgment evidence merely showed that the deceased
was a minor, and did not demonstrate that the waiver provision denied the
175. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3a (Vernon 1967).
176. Id.; see Whitehead v. American Indus. Transp., Inc., 746 S.W.2d 273, 274 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3a (Vernon
1967) provides:
An employee of a subscriber shall be held to have waived his right of action at
common law or under any statute of this State to recover damages for injuries
sustained in the course of his employment if he shall not have given his em-
ployer, at the time of his contract of hire, notice in writing that he claimed said
right or if the contract of hire was made before the employer became a sub-
scriber, if the employee shall not have given the said notice within five days
notice of such subscription.
Id.
177. See Whitehead, 746 S.W.2d at 274-75.
178. 746 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
179. Id.; TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.001-.011, (Vernon 1986).
180. 746 S.W.2d at 274; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
181. 746 S.W.2d at 274-75.
182. Id. at 274.
183. Id. Apparently, a minor or his or her representative can attack these constitutional
provisions if the summary judgment evidence shows that the minor's age, intelligence, or expe-
rience affected his ability to choose his right to reserve his common law rights, as compared to
the workers' compensation benefits.
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minor of any opportunity to choose his legal remedies due to his age, experi-
ence, maturity, or judgment. Without this summary judgment evidence, the
court refused to address the plaintiff's constitutional challenges.
L. Intentional Injuries
The Workers' Compensation Act bars an employee's claims of negligence
against his employer and also any nondeath claims for gross negligence
against the employer.1 84 The Act does not bar an employee from suing his
employer when the employer commits an intentional tort.' 85 Rodriguez v.
Naylor Industries 18 6 demonstrates how the distinction between a specific in-
tent to injure an employee and gross negligence sometimes becomes blurred.
In Rodriguez an injured employee's wife brought a suit against her hus-
band's employer for loss of consortium.' 87 While driving the employer's
truck, the employee had an accident and sustained injuries. Although the
employee survived, his wife alleged that his injuries made him incapable of
maintaining marital relations. She further claimed that his employer inten-
tionally caused his injuries.' 8 8 To support this argument, she explained that
her husband's supervisor directed him to deliver a truck out of town. The
truck had several tires that lacked treads, appeared cracked and split, and
revealed the inner tube of the tire. 189 The employee examined the truck tires
and told his supervisor about their unsafe condition.' 90 The supervisor re-
sponded with derogatory comments and told the employee to follow his
orders. 191
During the trip, one of the front truck tires exploded. 192 The employee
called another supervisor and asked for a spare tire. The employee did not
receive a spare tire; instead, his supervisor advised him to rotate one of the
back tires forward as a replacement. 193 When a second tire exploded, the
truck flipped and the employee was injured. 194
184. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989), which provides:
The employees of a subscriber and the parents of minor employees shall have no
right of action against their employer or against any agent, servant or employee
of said employer for damages for personal injuries, and the representatives and
beneficiaries of deceased employees shall have no right of action against such
subscribing employer or his agent, servant or employee for damages for injuries
resulting in death, but such employees and their representatives and beneficiaries
shall look for compensation solely to the association, as the same is hereinafter
provided for.
Id.; see Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. 1980); Massey v. Armco Steel
Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. 1983).
185. See Massey, 652 S.W.2d at 933.
186. 751 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ granted).




191. Id. The supervisor responded to the employee, "You damn Mexicans, all you do isjust bitch .... That truck has to go to Port Lavaca and then to Corpus Monday morning. ...






Mrs. Rodriguez alleged that this evidence of conscious indifference toward
her husband's safety showed that the employer's intentional conduct re-
sulted in injury to her husband. Additionally, Mrs. Rodriguez produced an
expert's affidavit which stated that, in the expert's opinion, the employee's
supervisor would have known, with "substantial certainty" that the tires
would explode. 195
The court of appeals held that the summary judgment evidence did not
show that the employer intended to cause injury. 196 The appellate court, in
distinguishing intentional injuries from gross negligence, stated that "intent"
requires either that the employer desires the consequences of his actions or
that the employer believes with substantial certainty that his actions will
cause injuries to his employee. 197 Thus, the court held that the intentional
failure to provide an employee with safe transportation does not constitute
an intentional tort, except when proof exists that the employer believes with
substantial certainty that his conduct will injure the employee. 198
One judge dissented, arguing that to grant summary judgment in this situ-
ation was inequitable. This judge found that the employer deliberately ex-
posed the employee to an unreasonable risk of harm, which resulted in the
employee's injury. 199 The dissenter argued that the employer should not be
immune from common law liability under these facts on the mere ground
that the employer did not actually intend to injure the employee.2° ° Fur-
ther, the dissenter argued that the fact finder could reasonably infer the em-
ployer's intent in this situation because the employer's acts of making the
employee travel on poor tires showed its outrageous indifference to the em-
ployee's safety. According to the dissent, these actions showed that the em-
ployer knew or should have known with substantial certainty that its actions
would result in injury to the employee. 20 1. Thus, this judge argued that a
conscious, deliberate exposure of the employee to an unreasonable risk of
harm essentially amounts to knowing with substantial certainty or intending
to harm the employee. 20 2
M. Discovery
Party communications remain privileged provided that a party makes the
communication after having good cause to believe that a suit will be filed or
195. Id. at 702-03.
196. Id. at 703.
197. Id.; Castleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. 1981); Reed Tool
Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. 1985). The Texas Supreme Court has adopted the
definition of intent provided in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8a (1965). This section
defines intent as "the act or desire is to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that
the consequences are substantially certain to result from it." 689 S.W.2d at 406.
198. 751 S.W.2d at 703.
199. Id. Justice Levy notes that his dissent focuses on the majority opinion's narrow inter-
pretation of the definition of "intentional injury." Id.
200. Id. at 704.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 704-05.
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after institution of a lawsuit. 20 3 City of San Antonio v. Spears2° 4 considered
the question of whether a prehearing conference report prepared by an em-
ployer after the employee filed a compensation claim constituted a privileged
document. The trial court ordered that the employer submit the prehearing
conference report to the claimant, holding that the report did not fall under
the investigative privilege rule.20 5 The carrier filed a writ of mandamus and
the appellate court reversed the trial court and found the document to be
privileged. 20 6
The court of appeals reasoned that the terms "litigation," "suit," and
"lawsuit" as used in the investigative privilege rules encompassed proceed-
ings before the IAB.20 7 Any other interpretation would not take into consid-
eration the administrative powers of the IAB, including its powers to
determine legal questions such as: whether an employee injured himself in
the course of his employment, and whether the employee was an independ-
ent contractor.20 8 Additionally, the court reasoned that if the adverse party
could discover these reports, carriers would not prepare them until after
they had determined whether or not to appeal the Board's award. 20 9
N. Compromise Settlement Agreement
In order to set aside a compromise settlement agreement based upon a
constructive fraud, the claimant must show:
(1) misrepresentations made to the worker about his or her injuries;
(2) made by the employer, workers' compensation carrier or an agent
of either;
(3) reliance by the worker on the misrepresentations; and
(4) a meritorious claim for more compensation than was paid. 210
In Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Remy 21t the court of appeals
held that even though the claimant selected the doctor, the doctor could be
203. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166(3)(d), which states:
Party Communications. With the exception of discoverable communications
prepared by or for experts, and other discoverable communications, between
agents or representatives or the employees of a party to the action or communi-
cations between a party and that party's agents, representatives or employees,
when made subsequent to the occurrence or transaction upon which the suit is
based, and in anticipation of the prosecution or defense of the claims made a
part of the pending litigation. For the purpose of this paragraph, a photograph
is not a communication.
204. 751 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
205. See id. at 552. The parties held a hearing on the privilege pursuant to Peeples v. The
Honorable Fourth Supreme Judicial Dist., 701 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1985).
206. 751 S.W.2d at 552.
207. Id. at 554.
208. Id. at 553. Although the court noted that the IAB does not act as a court, that the
claims filed before it do not constitute pleadings, and that the rules of evidence do not apply to
IAB hearings, the court recognized that the IAB does have administrative powers. For in-
stance, courts give lAB orders the force of a final judgment once the period of time for appeal-
ing the award has passed. Id.
209. Id.
210. Rodriguez v. American Home Assur. Co., 735 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex. 1987).
211. 752 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no writ).
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an agent of the carrier. 21 2 Thus, if the doctor misdiagnosed the claimant,
and the claimant relied upon the misdiagnosis to his detriment in settling his
workers' compensation case, the claimant could have the settlement agree-
ment set aside. 2 1
3
The Remy claimant went to an orthopedic surgeon of his own selection
after experiencing an accident at work. The surgeon examined his back and
reported his condition to the insurance company. Although the carrier did
not specifically authorize the doctor to treat the claimant, the doctor treated
the claimant for approximately six months. 21 4 Thereafter, the carrier re-
quested the doctor's report. Both parties relied on the report in reaching the
settlement.
Within six months of the settlement, the claimant's condition deterio-
rated, showing that the doctor had misdiagnosed his condition. 215 The jury
answered special issues favorable to the claimant in setting aside the settle-
ment, but the trial court disregarded the jury finding that the doctor had
acted as the agent of the carrier. 21 6 On appeal, the appellate court reaf-
firmed the jury findings and specifically held that a physician can become an
agent of the carrier if the carrier or the employer uses the physician's report
in reaching the settlement.21 7 Since the carrier used the claimant's doctor's
report to settle the claim, the claimant's doctor acted as the agent of the
carrier. 2 18
0. Calculation of Wage Rate
The court in Hines v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.21 9 faced the question of
whether the wage rate for a specific injury should be calculated before or
after multiplying the percentage of contribution of a prior injury to a
worker's present loss of use. In Hines the employee sustained an injury to
his right leg in the course of his employment. He had previously suffered a
compensible injury to his right knee. The jury found that the employee sus-
212. Id. at 620.
213. Id. at 620-21.
214. Id. at 619. The carrier's adjuster gave the employee a slip authorizing the doctor to
examine the employee and report his condition back to the insurance company. The slip did
not authorize the doctor to treat the employee's condition.
215. Id. Because it was medically impossible to diagnose the employee's problems absent
the progression of his disease, the doctor did not act negligently when he failed to diagnose the
full extent of the employee's problems. Id.
216. Id. The jury answered on special issues that (1) the employee was totally and perma-
nently disabled as a result of the injuries; (2) the carrier and employee entered into the settle-
ment agreement based upon representations made by the claimant's doctor; (3) the doctor
made false representations; (4) the employee relied upon the representations and would not
have entered into the compromise settlement agreement absent the representations; (5) the
parties acted on a mutual mistake of a material fact when they signed the compromise settle-
ment agreement because of the doctor's misrepresentations; and (6) the claimant's doctor acted
on behalf of the carrier when he made the incorrect representations regarding the employee's
injury. Id.
217. Id. at 620.
218. Id.; see Rodriguez v. American Home Assur. Co., 735 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex. 1987),
on remand, 749 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
219. 754 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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tained a total loss of use of his right leg for a period of several weeks and that
he suffered a 75% permanent loss of use of his right leg for several weeks,
and that 50% of this loss of use resulted from his prior knee injury.220 In
assessing damages, the trial court computed the basic figure of the em-
ployee's wages by calculating 662/3% of the employee's weekly wage and
comparing it to the statutory maximum and then using the lower figure.2 21
Thereafter, the court applied the percentage of incapacity (present incapac-
ity minus contribution due to prior injury) to that figure. 222 The employee
appealed, contending that the percentage contribution of the old injury
should have been applied to his average weekly wage rate before the court
calculated the base rate. This formula clearly resulted in a higher recovery
for the employee. 223 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's calcula-
tions. The court reasoned that specific injuries require the use of a method
for calculating damages that differs from that used for general injuries. 2 24
Further, the Workers' Compensation Act mandates that the court determine
the basic wage figure before applying the percentage of incapacity of the
prior injury to the current compensable injury.225
220. Id. at 804.
221. Id. at 804-05.
222. Id. at 805.
223. See id. at 805. Because this formula results in a higher recovery for the employee, the
employee argued that the court should apply this formula rather than the formula which re-
sults in a lower recovery. The employee contended that the use of this formula furthers the
policy that courts should construe the Workers' Compensation Act liberally in favor of the
employee. Id. See Stott v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 645 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. 1983).
224. Hines, 754 S.W.2d at 804-05; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12 (Vernon
Supp. 1989).
225. Hines, 754 S.W.2d at 805.
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